Journal of Algorithms and Computation
Open Access

Prisoner's Dilemma Under Global Game Framework

Document Type : Review Article

Author

Reza Habibi

Iran Banking Institute

https://doi.org/10.22059/jac.2026.413768.1259
Abstract
This paper studies the global game and its interesting properties in the famous game; i.e., prisoner's dilemma game. The game is described, its Nash equilibriums are derived and sensitivity analysis is studied. The problem is also extended. This solution is applied to study the problem of selling foreign currency before or after speculation attack. Finally, a conclusion section is given. This paper studies the global game and its interesting properties in the famous game; i.e., prisoner's dilemma game. The game is described, its Nash equilibriums are derived and sensitivity analysis is studied. The problem is also extended. This solution is applied to study the problem of selling foreign currency before or after speculation attack. Finally, a conclusion section is given.

Keywords

Global game
Nash equilibrium
Prisoner's dilemma
Sensitivity analysis
Selling currency game
Journal of Algorithms and Computation
Volume 58, Issue 1
July 2026
Pages 182-190

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